Uku Tooming: potential topics of supervision
1. Theories of mental content
What it is for a mental state to represent and have correctness conditions? Can intentionality be naturalized? What kinds of contentful mental states are there?
Philosophia, Vol. 43, No. 3. Special Issue: The Natural Origins of Content
Ramsey, W. 2010. Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge University Press.
Do we have privileged access to our own minds? How do we know what we believe, want, intend and feel? Can psychological research call our self-knowledge into question?
Brie Gertler "Self-Knowledge", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Gertler, B. 2011. Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
What are desires? What do we say when we say that we want something? How do we know what we want? What is the relation between desire and pleasure?
Tim Schroeder "Desire", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Lycan, W. 2012. Desire considered as a propositional attitude, Philosophical Perspectives, 26, 201–15.
What kinds of imaginative states are there? What is the nature of mental imagery? How to solve the puzzles of fictional emotions and imaginative resistance? Can imagination provide knowledge?
Tamar Gendler "Imagination", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Currie, G. & I. Ravenscroft. 2002. Recreative Minds. New York: Oxford University Press.
What kind of evidence is there for philosophical claims? How does philosophy differ from science? What kind of philosophical methods should we trust?
Haug, M.C. (Ed.) 2013. Philosophical Methodology: Armchair or Laboratory? Routledge.
6. Folk psychology
How do we know what other people believe or want? Why do others' beliefs and desires matter to us?
Zawidzki, T. 2013. Mindshaping. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Apperly, I. 2012. Mindreaders. Psychology Press.