Potential MA supervisors in Theoretical Philosophy
Bruno Mölder (Associate Professor) has a doctoral degree from the University of Konstanz. His areas of specialisation are philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
Read more about the topics that dr Mölder is ready to supervise.
Alexander Davies, (Research Fellow of Theoretical Philosophy) graduated with a PhD from King’s College, London. His areas of specialisation are philosophy of language and epistemology.
Read more about the topics that dr Davies is ready to supervise.
Vivian Puusepp, (Research Fellow of Theoretical Philosophy) graduated with a PhD from University of Tartu. Her philosophy of mind, phenomenology, social cognition.
Read more about the topics that dr Bohl is ready to supervise.
Alex Davies: potential topics of supervision
I am available for supervision on topics within philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. I have current research interests specifically in linguistic context-sensitivity, the interaction between power and language, as well as the interaction between power and knowledge. If you have an idea for something you'd like to write or write about then please email me (davies [ät] ut.ee) and let's discuss it. Below I list some possible readings for some of the topics I have worked on or am currently working on.
Crispin Wright, “Relativism about truth itself: Haphazard thoughts about the very idea” in Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. (Oxford: OUP, 2008).
John MacFarlane, “Relativism” in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell (New York: Routledge, 2012)
Tim Sundell, “Disagreements about taste” in Philosophical Studies 155(2) 267-288 (2011).
Dan Lopez de Sa, “Presuppositions of Commonality” in Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. (Oxford: OUP, 2008).
Recanati, F. Truth Conditional Pragmatics (Oxford: OUP, 2010)
Travis, C. Occasion-Sensitivity (Oxford: OUP, 2008)
Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 22(4) 293-330 (1993).
J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
Christopher Hom, “The Semantics of Racial Epithets”, Journal of Philosophy 105(8) 416-440 (2008).
Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out (Oxford: OUP 2010).
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1962).
Rudolph Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950). Reprinted in the Supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
Communication and semantic externalism
Miranda Fricker, “Powerlessness and Social Interpretation” in Epistemic 3(1-2) (2006).
Sally Haslanger, “Language, Politics, and “the Folk”: Looking for “the meaning” of 'race'” in The Monist 93(2) (2010).
Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975); reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: CUP, 1975).
Vivian Puusepp: potential topics of supervision
I am happy to supervise theses on cognitive philosophy and philosophy of mind. I am also keen on interdisciplinary topics that fall between philosophy and psychology. Below are some examples, other topics and suggestions are available on request.
1. Social cognition and interpersonal relationships
What cognitive processes enable people to interact with, relate to and understand other people? Why do we care about what other people feel or think? Do we ever get other people’s mental states right? How did social cognition evolve and how does it develop in childhood? What is special about human social cognition?
Bohl, Vivian. 2014. How do we understand others? Beyond theories of mindreading and interactionism. Tartu: University of Tartu Press.
2. Self and self-consciousness
Does being conscious imply being self-conscious in some sense? How to explain our sense of self? Do we really have selves and if so, in what sense? Are selves socially constructed?
Gallagher, Shaun & Zahavi, Dan. 2014. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bruno Mölder: potential topics of supervision
I am happy to supervise theses on various topics in philosophy of mind and psychology. Below are some examples, other topics and suggestions are available on request.
How do we understand other people? Do we apply an implicit theory, simulate others’ thoughts or is social cognition rather an embodied and interactive affair?
Ravenscroft, Ian, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Gordon, Robert M., "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Experience of time
There are several philosophical puzzles concerning subjective time: What does it take to experience the world as flowing continuously from one instant to another? How can we experience change? Is the subjective present extended in time?
Interpretivism in the philosophy of mind
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the interpretivist position, the view that interpretation is central for propositional attitudes and possibly other mental states? Most famous versions of this view have been propounded by Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett.
Psychological and social mechanisms of disagreement
What are the psychological and social mechanisms underpinning disagreement? What role do emotions and social cognition play in disagreement?
Experimental philosophy of mind
What can the empirical results of the experimental philosophy tell us about mind and consciousness?
Uku Tooming: potential topics of supervision
1. Theories of mental content
What it is for a mental state to represent and have correctness conditions? Can intentionality be naturalized? What kinds of contentful mental states are there?
Philosophia, Vol. 43, No. 3. Special Issue: The Natural Origins of Content
Ramsey, W. 2010. Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge University Press.
Do we have privileged access to our own minds? How do we know what we believe, want, intend and feel? Can psychological research call our self-knowledge into question?
Brie Gertler "Self-Knowledge", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Gertler, B. 2011. Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
What are desires? What do we say when we say that we want something? How do we know what we want? What is the relation between desire and pleasure?
Tim Schroeder "Desire", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Lycan, W. 2012. Desire considered as a propositional attitude, Philosophical Perspectives, 26, 201–15.
What kinds of imaginative states are there? What is the nature of mental imagery? How to solve the puzzles of fictional emotions and imaginative resistance? Can imagination provide knowledge?
Tamar Gendler "Imagination", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Currie, G. & I. Ravenscroft. 2002. Recreative Minds. New York: Oxford University Press.
What kind of evidence is there for philosophical claims? How does philosophy differ from science? What kind of philosophical methods should we trust?
Haug, M.C. (Ed.) 2013. Philosophical Methodology: Armchair or Laboratory? Routledge.
6. Folk psychology
How do we know what other people believe or want? Why do others' beliefs and desires matter to us?
Zawidzki, T. 2013. Mindshaping. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Apperly, I. 2012. Mindreaders. Psychology Press.